Response
Theodicy is a branch of philosophy that addresses the problem of evil in the context of God’s existence. If God is just, holy, and good, how can evil and suffering coexist? This is the central question that theodicy grapples with. One of the most well-known articulations of the “problem of evil” dates back to the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus:
Is God willing to prevent evil but not able?
Then he is not all-powerful.
Is he able but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
If he is both able and willing?
Then where does evil come from?
If he is neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?
While most individuals may not engage with philosophers directly, they may encounter similar ideas in popular culture, such as a modified version presented by the character Lex Luthor in a recent action movie:
“If God is all-powerful, he cannot be all good. And if he is all good, then he cannot be all-powerful.” – Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice
One of the main challenges in discussing theodicy is the tendency to blur the definitions of key terms or imbue them with meanings that are not relevant to the argument. To truly grasp the concept of theodicy, one must meticulously define the terms used and adhere to those definitions.
What evil truly is, remains a contentious issue.
The central dilemma in the “Problem of Evil” lies in defining the nature of evil itself. Evil is commonly viewed as a counterforce to good, akin to the yin and yang or opposing poles of a magnet. This definition of evil poses a logical quandary for believers: why would God create evil? Just as God created gravity, light, and magnetism, why would He also bring evil into existence?
The most plausible explanation is that God did not create evil. Evil, in its essence, does not exist independently but rather as the absence of goodness. Similarly, while God created light, did He create darkness as well? The answer is no, as darkness is simply the absence of light.
Evil itself does not exist. Darkness is simply a term we use to describe a relative lack of light. It is entirely defined in terms of deprivation: the absence of something else.
The same applies to physical heat. Heat is a term used to explain the motion of atoms and molecules. When an object is cold, it just has less molecular movement, relatively speaking. At absolute zero, all molecular movement would cease completely, theoretically. You cannot get any “colder” than that because there is no way to add more coldness. You can only remove heat, and when all the heat is gone, that is as far as you can go.
The same fundamental point applies to many descriptive words. Terms like short or thin all refer to the relative lack of something else. There is no actual “shortness,” and one cannot “add” shortness. There are only varying measurements of length. Printer paper is not “thin” because it has more “thinness” added to it than cardboard. We use the term thin so we do not have to say “less thick.”
An example from mathematics is the constant i, or the square root of negative one (√(-1)). In reality, negative numbers cannot have a “square root,” but there are instances in advanced equations where it is a convenient shortcut. The term i has meaning, at least in theory, even though we know it is not a literal description of some tangible thing.
Another mathematical example is the “number” 0. The term zero literally refers to that which does not exist. It is a reference to nothing, to the absence of something. This is why adding or subtracting 0 results in no change, multiplying 0 is still “nothing,” and dividing by 0 is a logical contradiction. Is zero “real”? In the sense that it is a term we can understand and that has use, yes. But, of course, 0 does not exist in any tangible sense. It is literally defined as the absence of something (everything) else.
Putting all of these thoughts together, the same can be said of evil. The term has meaning and use, but we do not have to assume it is.
Evil is an actual, tangible, created entity. It is a relative term used to describe anything that deviates from the will or moral perfection of God. Evil is essentially the absence of goodness.
This line of reasoning significantly contributes to the development of a proper theodicy. If evil is not a “thing” created by God or an external force beyond His control, then the interpretation of these questions changes significantly. Any assertion that implies God created, formed, or produced evil is immediately refuted. All that is necessary is for God to have “allowed” it.
Our will versus God’s will
However, the discussion on how we define evil does not end there. For many critics, the argument against God being “all good” inherently implies “never permitting any evil.” The first issue with this perception of God’s goodness is logical, and the second is personal.
From a logical standpoint, if God is perfect, then anything differing from Him in any manner is no longer perfect. Absolute, complete perfection cannot be altered and still remain absolutely and completely perfect. Consequently, anything created by God is inherently different from Him and therefore must be less than perfect. Viewing evil as a departure from God’s goodness leads to two potential scenarios for God to completely avoid any form of evil.
Firstly, God could opt not to create anything at all.
Secondly, God could create but restrict anything in His creation from possessing moral free will. In essence, prohibiting any deviation that could lead to “evil.” However, this approach undermines every other sentiment, principle, and advantage that critics of God aim to support. In essence, a universe logically incapable of evil is also one logically incapable of love, nobility, sacrifice, or success.
A being incapable of engaging in evil is also unable to demonstrate mercy, compassion, or love. It is evident that if God had created entities with this limitation, creation would appear futile. God seeks love and glory—and our endorsement of that desire is crucial.
Irrelevant to its truth—but there can be no love given by robotic, choice-less creations.
So, for God to preclude even the possibility of evil, He must either not create or create something utterly pointless. Logically, it stands to reason that God allows the potential for evil because such freedom is intrinsically the same that allows the potential for nobility and virtue. Without that potential, no love or other “good” things can actually occur.
This leads to the “personal” problem with demanding that God disallow evil. Once a person accepts the idea that evil has to be possible in order for us to have a meaningful free will, the next step is often to criticize God for allowing “too much” evil or the “wrong kinds” of evil. Here, again, definitions and personal preferences are key.
Critics of God often make an assumption at this stage. They make statements such as “a good God might allow some evil, but He would never allow X.” Once again, the logic leading to this point shows that God does not have to create evil for it to exist. This question also assumes, irrationally, that there cannot be things worse than X. Logically, it’s possible there could be evils even worse than X that God has prevented, and, because He has prevented them, we are unaware they are even possible. To continue to criticize God on account of there being “too much” evil is to waffle between logic and emotion.
We may not like the idea that God allows certain kinds of evil. And, logically, there is nothing invalid about a person choosing to say, “I reject obedience to God because I don’t agree with His morality.” But theodicy is not a question of making God agree with our whims. What we cannot say, logically, is that if God does not act according to our moral preferences, then He cannot exist in moral perfection. This makes the critic the ultimate standard of morality!
To put that another way, claiming God cannot exist or cannot be perfectly moral unless He agrees with my moral preferences is to say th
It is said: “I am morally perfect, so if God and I differ on some moral issue, the only possible reason is that God is flawed, and I am not.” Once again, a person is not logically prevented from taking this approach. However, just because it is a possible viewpoint does not make it a reasonable one.
Does this mean there could never be a circumstance where God’s supposed morality conflicts with what we see in our experience? Not at all. The issue—for the critic—is that many of the rules he claims God fails to live up to are simply fictional. God never promises to make everyone’s life easier or better, nor does He promise to alter cause and effect simply at our whims. There is an eternal context and a spiritual condition to what God tells us about suffering and evil in this world. This is a key part of any reasonable theodicy.
So why does evil exist?
Logic dictates that God does not have to create evil for evil to exist. Logic also dictates that God does not have to conform to our moral preferences to be perfectly good. So, how can a person justify the existence of evil in a way that is relevant to our own experience?
The first point that must be understood is that God is consistent in His “allowance” of our free will and the natural function of His creation. As it turns out, the fact that God is consistent in His moral behaviors greatly frustrates the skeptic. This is because God’s consistency goes against our human preferences: we would prefer God to bend or break the rules to suit our own selfish desires.
For instance, God is consistent in allowing human beings a wide range of free will. This includes granting people the freedom to reject His will and disregard His commands. This may lead to consequences for those who choose to disobey. Similarly, much of human suffering on earth stems from the decisions of other individuals. Once again, God is consistent in allowing humanity the freedom to act.
This is essentially a restatement of the argument.
Of the previous argument concerning allowing the potential for evil, because, without it, there is no potential for good. The same natural laws that enable us to construct skyscrapers and develop medicines can be misused to create bombs and illegal drugs. They are the same laws that result in earthquakes and hurricanes. Frequently, we make decisions aware of the risks involved or with a deliberate intent to misuse creation and then attribute blame to God when those potential problems arise.
The second point to consider is that God is not motionless, silent, and inactive in the presence of evil. Here, once again, is a point where the critic appears inconsistent. The same voices that argue, “God is not intervening enough to halt evil” are typically the same ones who object when God does take action to prevent evil. The incidents often cited by critics of the Bible as proof of God’s alleged immorality (such as the destruction of Sodom) were occasions when God explicitly stated that His actions were a response to malevolence. They were His way of halting and preventing further evil.
The same critic who exclaims, “God does nothing about evil,” is frequently the same individual criticizing God for His actions in the flood. Or against the Amalekites. Or at Jericho. God has already implemented measures to counteract and combat evil. Asserting that He does “nothing” is simply inaccurate. Arguing that He does “too much” to prevent evil is all well and good, but that renders theodicy irrelevant and the problem of evil moot.
The third point is that we have a limited perspective. This is not a very convincing argument, particularly for someone opposed to the concept of God. However, logically, it must be acknowledged that the God being examined is believed to be omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, and omnipresent. We, on the other hand, are not. We often hear employers, military personnel, parents, doctors, and others reminding us that there are things occurring “behind the scenes” that we simply cannot comprehend. Our inability to grasp certain decisions is not solid evide
Once that those decisions are incorrect. It signifies nothing more than that we have an incomplete understanding.
Finally, one must consider all criticisms of evil within the complete context of Christian teaching. If this life were the sole existence, then the issue of evil would be much more significant. However, as per the Bible, this is not the sole life we will experience. A person may reject that belief, but they cannot critique the God of the Bible and His morality as if the afterlife were not an essential part of Christian moral comprehension. Christians trust that all injustices—each and every one—will be accounted for, eventually. They believe that God is presently acting to restrain evil, just as He has in the past. The Bible clarifies that the challenges we face currently are not the reason for our existence, nor do they determine our worth. Instead, there is a purpose to the suffering and a design that includes rectifying all injustices.
Back to the beginning
Examining these concepts, we can observe that Epicurus’ interpretation of the problem of evil contains a fatal flaw. This can be summarized in one simple declaration: the “God” Epicurus condemns is not the God of the Bible. In other words, Epicurus’ critique is only applicable to the gods of Greek polytheism and within the framework of a polytheistic perception of reality.
The Christian can counter Epicurus as follows:
Is God willing to prevent evil but not able to? Then He is not omnipotent. God is willing to restrict evil and has taken action to achieve that. Therefore, He remains omnipotent.
Is He able but unwilling? Then He is malevolent. God is capable but unwilling to eliminate our free will. Hence, He is still omnibenevolent.
Is He both able and willing? Then where does evil originate? God has intervened to overcome evil. Evil arises simply when we deviate from His will.
Is He neither able nor willing? Then why label Him as God? God is unwilling to impede our free will. Your disapproval does not diminish His status as God.
And, to the more pop-c
Culture-friendly Lex Luthor, Christianity can respond as follows:
“If God is all-powerful, He cannot be all good. And if He’s all good, then He cannot be all-powerful.” God can be all-powerful and choose not to act according to your preferences. When you say “all good,” what you really mean is “doing things my way”; and when you say, “all-powerful,” what you really mean is “capable of making us simultaneously free and robotic,” which is gibberish. An all-powerful, all-good God can allow evil to bring about the greater, eternal good.
Human beings will always struggle with the problem of evil. Theodicy is not an attempt to make God appear as palatable as possible. In fact, the opposite is true. A truly rational theodicy has to begin with the admission that our dislike of something does not make it false. The question is not whether God is compatible with our personal preferences. The problem of evil is simply the debate over whether or not God is logically possible. Theodicy, considering all logic and evidence together, clearly states He is—whether we like Him or not.